Abstract. This article will study a class of deduction systems that allow for a limited use of the modus ponens method of deduction. We will show that it is possible to devise axiom systems α that can recognize their consistency under a deduction system D provided that: 1) α treats multiplication as a 3-way relation (rather than as a total function), and that 2) D does not allow for the use of a modus ponens methodology above essentially the levels of Π1 and Σ1 formulae.
1. Pudlák [41] has demonstrated that no extension of axiom system Q [7, 58] can verify its own Hilbert consistency localized on a definable cut. Solovay [52] has revised Pudlák's formalism with some additional techniques of Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [34, 64] to establish that essentially all axiom systems recognizing Successor as a total function are unable verify their own Hilbert consistency. (Section 4 will review this prior literature in considerable detail.) 2. We developed in [70] a generalization of Item 1's result which showed that all axiom systems recognizing addition as a total function are unable to verify their 2-deductive consistency. 3. Expanding upon some techniques pioneered by Adamowicz, Paris, Pudlák, Solovay, Takeuti, Wilkie and Zbierski in [1, 4, 38, 41, 52, 57, 64] , we developed in [68] a further new result which showed that no natural axiom system can recognize multiplication as total and also verify its cut-free consistency (or "semantic tableaux" [66] consistency). 4. Section 6 of our current article will describe a close cousin of IS D (A), called NS
, that is essentially always inconsistent. This fact will be interesting because the only substantial difference between IS D (A) and NS k,m D (A) will be the respective manners in which they define the word "this" in the Statement + 's Kleene-like axiom.
A detailed review of the prior literature will appear in Section 4. It will explain more fully exactly how our work is related to the prior literature. Our two new results about IS D (A) and NS k,m D (A) shall represent a pair of closely matching positive and negative results. Also, IS D (A) will be significant because it will fill most of the gap that was left unexplored by results (1)- (4) .
In essence, the close match between these positive and negative results will be mathematically significant, regardless of whether or not it is found later to have added significance for epistemology. From a mathematical standpoint, these theorems are useful because the mixture of their opposing positive and negative results will help characterize the exact threshold-level where the Second Incompleteness Theorem takes force. This paper will be divided into three parts. Sections 2 and 3 will summarize our new results. Section 4 will be a literature survey. Sections 5 and 6 will prove our main new theorems.
This article is entirely self-contained. It should be comprehensible to most logicians. A researcher who has taken an intensive 2-semester graduate-level course on logic should probably be able to follow most of the gist of this paper. §2. Description of Main Results. Let us define a mapping F (a 1 , a 2 ...a j ) to be a Non-Growth function iff F (a 1 , a 2 , ...a j ) ≤ M aximum(a 1 , a 2 , ...a j ) for all values of a 1 , a 2 , ...a j . Six examples of non-growth functions are:
1. Integer Subtraction where x − y is defined to equal zero when x ≤ y, 2. Integer Division where x ÷ y equals x when y = 0, and it equals x/y otherwise, 3. Root(x, y) which equals x 1/y when y ≥ 1, and it equals x when y = 0. 4. M aximum(x, y), 5. Logarithm(x) = Log 2 (x) when x ≥ 2, and it equals zero otherwise. 6 . Count(x, j) designating the number of "1" bits among x's rightmost j bits.
These six function are called the Grounding Functions. Also, the term U-Grounding Function will henceforth refer to a set of functions that includes these six operations plus the growth functions of addition and Double(x) = x + x.
All our results will use a U-Grounding language. This notation is technically unnecessary -because a system that uses the combination of Equation ( 2) (which implies addition and doubling are total functions) along with only the first six non-growth Grounding operations would have properties similar to the U-Grounding language.
∀x ∀y ∃z x = z − y (2) However, our notation is much simplified under a language employing function symbols also for addition and Double(x) = x + x. The virtue of this notation is that it uses no more than 2 Log 2 N appearances of the addition and doubling function symbols (applied to the input of "1") to encode every integer N ≥ 2. Such a term will be called a U-Grounded Binary Representation of N, and it will be denoted as N . For instance, 25 can be encoded as:
1 + Double( Double( Double( 1 + Double(1) ) ) ).
The use of logic's conventional notation about Π n and Σ m sentences is technically inappropriate in this paper because the latter notation (with its multiplication function symbol) is suitable only for axiom systems which recognize multiplication as a total function. Instead, our analogs for Π n and Σ m in the U-Grounding Function language are called Π * n and Σ * m . Here, a term t is defined to be a constant, variable or a U-Grounding function symbol (whose input arguments are recursively defined terms). Also, the quantifiers in the wffs ∀ v ≤ t Ψ(v) and ∃ v ≤ t Ψ(v) are called bounded quantifiers. We will say a formula Φ belongs to the ∆ * 0 class if it uses the U-Grounding primitives as its function symbols, the two relation symbols of " = " and " < ", and all its quantifiers are bounded. (Following conventional logic notation, we will sometimes also use the terms " Π * 0 " and " Σ * 0 " to designate the ∆ * 0 class.) For n ≥ 1, a formula Υ shall be called Π * n iff it is written in the form ∀v 1 ∀v 2 ... ∀v k Φ, where Φ is Σ * n−1 . Likewise, Υ is called Σ * n iff it is written in the form ∃v 1 ∃v 2 ... ∃v k Φ, where Φ is Π * n−1 . Also, Υ is called Q * n iff it is a Boolean combination of several Σ * n and Π * n formulae (using the standard connective symbols of ∧ , ∨ , ¬ and → ).
The preceding notation is the same as [20] 's quite conventional definitions for Σ n , Π n and Q n except that the definitions of Σ * n , Π * n and Q * n employ a U-Grounding language instead of a language using the primitives of arithmetic. In particular since our U-Grounding language has no function symbol for multiplication, our U-Grounding based axiom systems α do not implicitly assume that multiplication is a total function. However, they do certainly retain an ability to encode the graph M (x, y, z) of multiplication as a ∆ * 0 formula. For instance, one possible ∆ * 0 encoding for M (x, y, z) is illustrated below:
Equation (4)'s formal encoding of M (x, y, z)'s graph as a ∆ * 0 formula will add a substantial level of semantic depth to our U-Grounding axiom systems α because it will imply that that these logics will have an understanding of multiplication's main generic properties (except of course for the deliberately omitted totality condition of " ∀x ∀y ∃ z M (x, y, z) ".)
In a context where (α, D) is an ordered pair with α representing an axiom system and with D designating a deduction method, we will also use the following notation:
1. A Level(n) Definition of (α, D) 's consistency is the declaration that there exists no Π * n sentence Υ such that (α, D) supports simultaneous proofs of both Υ and ¬ Υ.
All the definitions of consistency, from Level(0-) up to Level(n) for any n , are equivalent to each other under strong enough models of arithmetic. However, many weak axiom systems do not have a mathematical strength to recognize this equivalence.
Our basic goal will be to determine for what configurations (α, D) is it possible to construct introspectively unified logics that have a Level(1) understanding of their own self-consistency. As we shall explain, it will turn out that it is impossible to construct self-justifying formalisms much above the Level(1). Indeed, there will be some respects in which a formalism is unable to have even a Level(0-) appreciation of its own selfconsistency.
It is helpful to review the definition of a semantic tableaux proof from Fitting's or Smullyan's textbooks [13, 51] before summarizing our new results. Let us call a sentence Prenex * Normalized iff it is either Π * i or Σ * i sentence, for some i ≥ 0. Define a Φ-Focused Candidate Tree for the axiom system α to be a tree structure whose root corresponds to the sentence ¬ Φ rewritten in Prenex * form and whose all other nodes are either axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes of the tree. Let the notation " A =⇒ B " indicate that B is a valid deduction when A is an ancestor of B in a specified proof tree. In this notation, the deduction rules allowed in a candidate tree are:
A pair of sibling nodes Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ ∨ Γ. 4. A pair of sibling nodes ¬Υ and Γ is allowed when their ancestor is Υ → Γ. 5. ∃v Υ(v) =⇒ Υ(u) where u is a newly introduced "Parameter Symbol". 6. Our variation of Rule 5 for bounded existential quantifiers of the form " ∃v ≤ s " is the identity:
where t denotes a U-Grounded term. These terms are defined to be parameter symbols, constant symbols, or U-Grounding functions with recursively defined inputs. (Without loss of generality, we may assume that each "parameter symbol" u, appearing in such a term t, is required to be introduced by some ancestor of the current node, which has used one of the Rules 5 or 6.) 8. Our variation of Rule 7 for bounded universal quantifiers of the form " ∀v ≤ s " is the identity:
Define a particular leaf-to-root branch in a candidate tree T to be Closed iff it contains both some sentence Υ and its negation ¬ Υ. A Semantic Tableaux proof of Φ is then defined to be a candidate tree, all of whose root-to-leaf branches are closed, such that the tree's root stores the sentence ¬Φ (rewritten in Prenex * normal form) and all its other nodes are either axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes.
The only distinction between our definition of a semantic tableaux proof and some other conventional definitions in [13, 51, 64 ] is that we require Φ's proof tree to have its root store ¬ Φ written in Prenex * normal form, whereas some other conventional definitions do not have the Prenex * requirement. All our results will also hold if we drop the Prenex * requirement. However, the notation will be greatly simplified if we begin with the Prenex * assumption.
We are now ready to define the main deductive method studied in this paper. Let H denote a sequence of ordered pairs (t 1 , p 1 ), (t 2 , p 2 ), ... (t n , p n ), where p i is a Semantic Tableaux proof of the theorem t i , and where is an arbitrary class of sentences. Define H to be a Tab− −List proof of a theorem T from the axiom system α iff T = t n and also:
1. Each axiom in p i 's proof is either one of t 1 , t 2 , ... , t i−1 or comes from α. 2. Each of the "intermediately derived theorems" t 1 , t 2 , ... , t n−1 must lie within the "pre-specified class" of sentences.
Tab− −List proofs are thus a stronger deductive method than the semantic tableaux by allowing for a limited type of modus ponens rule for sentences that belong to the intermediate class, that is formalized by . and Π * k sentences (respectively). This notation is useful for describing those introspectively unified logics that are feasible to construct, as well as those which are infeasible. Let A denote an arbitrary consistent axiom system that employs the U-Grounding language. Then our main positive result will be that if D represents either the Tab−U * 1 −List (or yet the stronger Tab−Q * 1 deductive method), then it is possible to construct an introspectively unified logic (α, D) where α is an axiom system capable of recognizing addition as a total function and also of verifying all A's Π One of these negativistic results will appear in Section 6 of the current paper: It will demonstrate some inherent limitations associated with Kleene-like "I am consistent" axioms.
Other directions in which it is impossible to further improve upon IS D (A) will be discussed during Section 4's literature survey. §3. Formal Description of the IS D (A) and NS k,m D (A) Axiom Systems. Let A denote any axiom system which employs the U-Grounding language, and D denote a deduction method. The symbol IS D (A) will denote an axiom system, associated with the ordered pair (A, D), that has a simultaneous capacity to:
1. prove all A's Π * 1 theorems, 2. recognize addition as a total function, and 3. contain a Kleene-like self-referencing axiom asserting its own Level(1) consistency under the deduction method D.
This section will define the IS D (A) axiom system and its similar-looking cousin, called NS
Despite their superficial resemblances, these two axiom system will actually have nearly the opposite properties. Our main goal will be to determine: Which deduction methods D shall make the IS D (A) formalism consistent? It will be a consequence of the joint research of largely Pudlák and Solovay (reviewed during Section 4's literature survey) that if D denotes Hilbert deduction then our IS D (A) system will be automatically inconsistent.
Formal Definition of IS D (A):
In a context where A is any axiom system employing the U-Grounding language and D denotes a deduction method, IS D (A) is defined to be an axiom system with the following four sub-groups of axioms:
Group-Zero: Two of the Group-zero axioms will define the two initial named constant symbols,c 0 andc 1 , that designate the integers of 0 and 1. The third and fourth Group-zero axioms will define the growth functions of addition and Double(x) = x + x. In conjunction, the net effect of these four Group-zero axioms will be to set up the machinery to define unambiguously any natural number n ≥ 2 as a term using only the constant symbolc 1 and employing O( Log n ) appearances of the function symbols for the addition and doubling operations. Section 2 had indicated that such a term, analogous to Equation (3), which encodes n in a binary-like format, will be denoted as n .
Group-1:
This axiom group will consist of a finite set of Π * 1 sentences, called F, such that the union of F with the Group-zero axioms is sufficient to prove every ∆ * 0 sentence that is valid under the standard model of the natural numbers. (Any finite set of Π * 1 sentences F with this property may be used to define Group-1. One suitable finite set of axioms was defined by Table I of our article [67] . However, any other alternate finite set of Π Group-2: Throughout this paper, Φ will denote the Gödel number of Φ. Also Prf A (t, p) will denote a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that p is a proof of the theorem t from the axiom system A. For each Π * 1 sentence Φ, the Group-2 schema will contain an axiom of the form (5), written in Π * 1 normalized form. Thus, the Group-2 scheme shall trivially endow IS D (A) with a capacity to verify all A's Π * 1 theorems.
Group-3:
This axiom group will consist of one single Π * 1 sentence stating essentially that:
* In the context of the deduction methodology D, there exists no two proofs of both some Π * 1 sentence and its formal negation from the union of the Group-zero, 1 and 2 axioms with this sentence (itself).
In order to formally encode the self-referential statement * as a Π * 1 sentence, let Pair(x, y) denote a ∆ * 0 formula indicating x is the Gödel number of a Π * 1 sentence and y is x 's negation. Also, let Prf IS D (A) (t, b) denote a ∆ * 0 formula that indicates that b is a proof (using the deduction method D ) of the theorem t from the axiom system IS D (A). In this context, the formal encoding of * can be approximated as:
More Detailed Description of the Group-3 Axiom:
A formal description of IS D (A)'s Group-3 axiom is more complicated than the abbreviated descriptions given either by Sentence * or by Equation (6)'s analog. The main added complication is because the Group-3 axiom declares the consistency of a formal set of axioms that includes "itself" (in the words of Sentence * ). As was noted in Section 1, the notion of an axiom including "itself" when it refers to the consistency of an axiom schema dates back to Kleene's 1938 paper [24] . However, Kleene's abbreviated description is insufficient to establish that Equation (6) can be encoded precisely as a Π Let UNION(A) denote the union of IS D (A)'s Group-Zero, Group-1 and Group-2 axioms. We will also use the following notation:
will denote a formula designating that p is a proof of the theorem t from the axiom system UNION(A) using the deduction method D.
ii: ExPrf D U N ION (A) ( h , t , p ) will be a formula stating that p is a proof (using the deduction method D ) of a theorem t from the union of the axiom system UNION(A) with the added axiom sentence whose Gödel number equals h .
iii: Subst ( g , h ) will denote Gödel's classic substitution formula -which yields TRUE when g is an encoding of a formula and h is an encoding of a sentence that replaces all occurrence of free variables in g with the formally Gödel-encoded term of g .
iv:
SubstPrf D U N ION (A) ( g , t , p ) will denote the natural hybridizations of the constructs from Items (ii) and (iii) which yields a Boolean value of TRUE exactly when there exists some integer h simultaneously satisfying both the conditions Subst ( g , h ) and ExPrf
Each of (i)-(iv) can be encoded as ∆ * 0 formulae. Thus, Appendices C and D of [67] explained how the first three of these predicates can receive ∆ * 0 encodings when one applies the theory of LinH functions [20, 25, 73] . In such a context, Equation (7) illustrates one possible ∆ * 0 encoding for SubstPrf
Utilizing (7)'s ∆ * 0 encoding for SubstPrf
, it is easy to encode the Group-3 axiom of IS D (A) as a Π * 1 sentence. Thus, let Γ(g) denote Equation (8)'s formula, and let n denote Γ(g)'s Gödel number. Then " Γ( n ) " is a Π * 1 sentence encoding this Group-3 axiom. D (A)'s Group-3 axiom will be sensitive to the change that was made by Item (a) above. Thus, the meaning of the word "this" in the Group-3 axiom that declares "This system is consistent" will be sensitive to the fact that the construct "this" now refers to a system that includes Υ( k , m ) as an axiom under its scope. One reason this topic is interesting is because it clarifies the nature of the threshold where the Second Incompleteness Theorem takes force. A second interesting aspect of Theorem 5 is that it is stronger than [67] 's prior results because 1) it uses a Level(1) (rather than Level(0-) ) definition of consistency and 2) its modus ponens rule extends to all Σ * 1 and Π * 1 sentences. Moreover, Section 4's literature survey will explain that IS D (A) is near-maximal because a variety of generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem show that it is difficult to further improve in most directions that one would want to pursue. §4. Literature Survey. Research into the incompleteness phenomena began with Gödel's 1931 paper [16] and with Rosser's removal [47] of Gödel's ω−consistency assumption. Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem indicated that no extension of Peano Arithmetic can verify its own consistency. The literature has subsequently used the symbol Q to denote an axiom system weaker than Peano Arithmetic, which contains no induction schema and which essentially only recognizes addition and multiplication as total functions. Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson [58] , showed a construct called "Essential Undecidability", was valid for Q, all its extensions, but none of its subsets.
Several articles have subsequently developed formal generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Q. The first of these, by Bezboruah-Shepherdson [7] , explored a paradigm that was dependent on the exact encoding of the provability predicate. Stronger results were subsequently derived by other authors. Some further notation is needed to summarize these results.
Let S(x) denote the "successor" operation that maps the integer x onto x + 1. A formula ϕ(x) is called [20] a Definable Cut for an axiom system α iff α can prove:
Definable cuts have been studied by a very extensive literature [1, 4, 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 23, 26, 25, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 55, 60, 61, 63, 64] . All axioms systems, strictly weaker than Peano Arithmetic, contain some definable cut that is not provably equivalent to the full set of integers. (In the proof-theory literature, the definition of "Definable cuts" is conceptually unrelated to Gentzen's notion of a sequent calculus deductive "cut rule", despite their similar sounding names.)
In a context where Υ(x) and ϕ(x) denote two definable cuts, the formula ϕ(x) has been called a Thinning of Υ(x) (relative to α ) iff α can prove:
Several articles [9, 20, 23, 25, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44, 61, 64, 67] have credited some unpublished comments of Robert Solovay for observing (in Definition 2's notation) that for each integer K and definable cut Υ(x), there exists a thinning ϕ(x) of Υ(x) where most naturally-formed arithmetic axiom system α can prove:
It is somewhat awkward to provide an exact summary of Solovay's theorem because Solovay never published it, and several authors [9, 20, 23, 25, 34, 37, 41, 43, 44, 61, 64, 67] have provided several slightly different interpretations of it. For instance, we were deliberately vague in the second sentence of this paragraph when stating Solovay's theorem applied to "most naturally-formed" arithmetic systems, since the latter italicized phrase can have several different interpretations. One possible resolution for this ambiguity is to introduce the notion of a Successor-based Arithmetic axiom system, as formally defined in the Footnote 1 , and to view Equation (12)'s Thinning Formalism as applying to any "Successor-based" axiom system α.
Equation (12)'s 2-part condition (and its various analogs) has been used to classify the generality of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Let Ψ denote Ψ 's Gödel number, and Prf D α (t, p) denote p is a proof of the theorem t from the axiom system α using the deduction method D. Then α will be said to recognize its Cut-Localized D-consistency under ϕ(x) iff α can prove:
The recent literature has sought to identify exactly what triples ( ϕ , D , α ) have the property that α can prove (15) 1 A "SUCCESSOR-BASED ARITHMETIC" axiom system α can be thought of intuitively as an axiomatic framework that recognizes Successor as a total function and which treats Addition, Multiplication and Exponentiation as three binary and ternary relations, denoted as A(x, y, z), M (x, y, z), and E(x, y), rather than as formally total functions. By this, we mean that α will posses a finite set of Π 1 −like axioms built out of the atomic objects of a successor function symbol and the five predicate symbols for the equality, less-than, A(x, y, z), M (x, y, z), and E(x, y) relations, such that the basic associative, commutative, distributive and identity axioms for addition and multiplication, as well as the inductive definition of the exponent operation, can be expressed by such Π 1 −like axioms. For instance, Equations (13) and (14) are examples of such Π 1 −like axioms, declaring that addition satisfies the commutative principle, and that the exponent operation satisfies its conventional inductive axiomatic definition.
IMPORTANT ADDED COMMENT about this Definition: There are several possible alternate somewhat broader definitions of a "Successor-Based Arithmetic" axiom system α, where both Equation (12)'s Thinning Formalism and Theorem * 's variation of the Second Incompleteness will continue to hold. For example, it follows from Benett's dissertation [6] that our preceding definition needs no explicit reference to E(x, y)'s exponent predicate (because it is ∆ 0 definable in terms of addition and multiplication). Also, the opening chapters of Nelson's book [34] essentially implied that we may permissibly start with weaker principles than the associative, commutative and distributive axioms for addition and multiplication. However for the purposes of the current chapter's abbreviated literature survey, the preceding definition for "SuccessorBased Arithmetics" is essentially adequate for understanding the main aspects of Equation (12)'s Thinning Formalism and its use by Theorem * .
any consistent extension of Q, then α must be unable to prove (15) 's statement about the "cut" ϕ.
The implications of Pudlák's theorem can be further appreciated when one reviews some additional work by Nelson, Solovay and Wilkie-Paris. One of the opening chapters of Nelson's book [34] explored an axiom system, called Q 0 , that had a conventional interpretation for the successor function, but which allowed for unconventional interpretations for addition and multiplication. By employing definable cuts as an intermediate concept, Nelson observed that this axiom system had many properties similar to the Tarski Aside from the work of Pudlák, Solovay and Wilkie-Paris already mentioned, there are many other generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for weak logics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, 29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 43, 45, 57, 66, 70] . The reason for our special interest in Theorem * is because this theorem, as described in reference [52] , can help identify the precise circumstances where it is infeasible to develop an introspectively unified logic. In particular, [67, 72] have shown it is possible to devise introspective systems (α, D) when either:
A: D represents Semantic Tableaux deduction and α is an axiom system that recognizes addition but not multiplication as a total function [65, 67] , or B: D represents Hilbert deduction and α is a system that drops the axiom that addition is a total function and replaces it with the weaker "additive naming convention" of [72] .
The Theorem * is relevant to the topics (A) and (B) because it shows that the natural hybrid of these two introspective logics is infeasible -for the case where D corresponds to Hilbert deduction and α recognizes addition (or even merely successor) as total.
Hence the contrast between Theorem * 's negative result with the positive results from Items (A) and (B) leads one to want to identify the exact juncture where the Second Incompleteness Theorem takes force among axiom systems that recognize addition as a total function. More precisely, it raises the following question:
# Which precise class of deduction methods D shall allow for an introspectively unified logic when α recognizes addition as a total function?
One part of an essentially 3-part answer to Question # was contained in our recent conference paper [70] . It showed that there existed a fixed Π * 1 theorem W, valid in the standard model of arithmetic (and actually provable from Peano Arithmetic), such that no consistent axiom system α can simultaneously prove W, recognize addition as a total function and verify its own self-consistency under either of the Tab−Σ * 2 or Tab−Π * 2 deduction methods. In effect, this means that the modus ponens rules for either Σ * 2 or Π * 2 sentences are sufficient to enact the power of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for essentially all axiom systems α which recognize addition as total. (The article [70] Section 5 will present the second part of our 3-way answer to Question #. It will explore this question from an essentially opposite perspective as [70] by seeking a positive rather than negative-oriented answer to Question #. By analyzing the properties of Section 3's IS D (A) system, Section 5 will show that an introspectively unified logic (α, D) can simultaneously recognize its self-consistency under a modus ponens principle at the level of Σ * 1 and Π * 1 formulae and also retain an ability to prove all Peano Arithmetic's Π * 1 theorems. A third part of our answer to the Question # will appear in Section 6. It will show that a close cousin of IS D (A), which Definition 3 had called NS
Hence, the combination of our positive and negative results will help characterize the threshold points where the Second Incompleteness Theorem takes force.
The prior literature has used an approach quite different from IS D (A)'s Group-3 axiomatic mechanism for formalizing a type of respect in which an axiom system α can evade the Incompleteness Theorem and obtain a partial understanding of its own selfconsistency. It has sought to accomplish this objective by formalizing some Definable Cuts ϕ such that an axiom system α has an ability to prove the validity of its own Cut-Localized D-consistency within the domain of ϕ 's definable cut (as is formally defined by Equation (15) ). Some examples of this type of phenomena are listed below:
A: In a context where D denotes a second order generalization of Gentzen's sequent calculus and α is a formalization of arithmetic among the natural numbers, the Kreisel-Takeuti system [27, 56] can prove Equation (15)'s statement about its own D-consistency. B: Nelson [34] demonstrated that a variant of the axiom system Q (with linear ordering) can corroborate Equation (15)'s statement about its own Cut-Localized consistency when D denotes Herbrand deduction and the cut ϕ is carefully chosen. C: Pudlák has formalized a major generalization of Items A and B that has very far-reaching and generic implications. The article [41] demonstrates that every "sequential" [20] axiom system α of finite cardinality can be associated with a definable cut ϕ such that α can prove Equation (15) is valid for ϕ when D denotes any cut-free method of deduction. (Indeed for an arbitrary definable cut Υ, this cut ϕ can be chosen to be a thinning of Υ. ) At the same time, [41] showed that no consistent α ⊃ Q can prove any form of (15) , 62] and which were also largely independently reconstructed by Pudlák.) For essentially all finite theories S and T , the theory S has an interpretation in T if and only if IΣ 0 + Exp can prove T 's Herbrand consistency implies S's Herbrand consistency. F: Let Con ϕ (IΣ 0 ) denote the particular variation of Equation (15) where α =IΣ 0 and where D designates Hilbert-style deduction. Krajícek [26] proved that for any IΣ 0 cut Υ there exists a thinner IΣ 0 cut ϕ such that the theorem IΣ 0 + Con
Visser [61] has generalized this construct to show that many consistent axiom systems, such as Q, ACA 0 and GB-Set Theory, have the property that no finite consistent extension of themselves implies there exists Hilbert-style proofs of 0=1 from themselves simultaneously positioned in every one of their definable cuts.
The underlying framework behind the IS D (A) system (of Section 3) is significantly different from the results summarized by Items A-F. The main reason IS D (A) is of interest is because it is able to internally recognize its own self-consistency in a global sense (rather than in a more narrow localized respect using Equation (15)'s Definable Cut formula ϕ ). On the other hand, the price we pay for this added degree of generality is quite considerable -since IS D (A) treats multiplication as a 3-way relation -rather than as a total function.
A key point that needs to be appreciated is that this trade-off is essentially unavoidable. This point can be understood by taking a look at the recent literature on weak axiom systems. Aside from the work of Pudlák, Solovay and Wilkie-Paris already mentioned, other recent papers about incompleteness for weak axiom systems (listed chronologically) include: Paris-Dimitracopoulos's observation [37] that one cannot universally define thinnings of definable cuts that are closed automatically under exponentiation, several generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Bounded Arithmetic by Buss and Ignjatovic [8, 9 ], Takeuti's observation [57] that one can define an exponentially-small and super-exponentially-small proof predicate that has some useful features for proving incompleteness results for cut-free deduction, AdamowiczZbierski's observations [1, 4] that IΣ 0 + Ω 1 is unable to verify its cut-free consistency, and some further generalizations of Adamowicz-Zbierski's result for IΣ 0 by Willard [66, 68] and more recently Salehi [48] . Moreover, [66, 68] has also extended this formalism to show that for each cut-free deduction method D, there exists a particular well-defined Π * 1 sentence, called W D , such that every consistent system α ⊃ W D is unable to simultaneously recognize multiplication as total and to also prove a theorem affirming its Level(0-) consistency under D. This result is relevant to any effort to hybridize the theorems from the articles listed in Items A-F with IS D (A) because it shows that such hybridizations cannot globalize Equation (15) 's notion of a Cut-Localized D-consistency, and simultaneously extend IS D (A) to recognize multiplication as total.
Our result about multiplication [66, 68] is different from the incompleteness theorems of Bezboruah-Shepherdson, Pudlák, Solovay and Wilkie-Paris in [7, 41, 52, 64] by applying to a paradigm where D is a cut-free rather than a cut-permissive deduction method. It establishes that any effort to find a cut-free deduction method D and an axiom system α -where α can prove its Level(0-) consistency under D without relying upon Equation (15)'s Definable Cuts -is fruitless when α recognizes multiplication as total and α ⊃ W D . Its incompleteness result explains why our goal will be to drop the Π * 2 axiom that declares multiplication is total, so that Section 5's IS D (A) axiom system can obtain a Tab−U * 1 −List (or slightly greater) understanding of its own self-consistency.
This alternate perspective is useful partly because it is interesting to consider axiomatic formalisms that do not rely upon Equation (15) It is unnecessary for the reader to examine Section 6.1's short 3-paragraph passage before he enters the current chapter. However, if a reader takes a quick glance at Section 6.1 at this juncture, he may find some of his most puzzling questions are answered.
Structural Aspects of Main Proof.
The Appendix A describes one canonical method for assigning Gödel encodings to proofs using the IS D (A) axiom system. This encoding method is roughly the same as what Wilkie-Paris [64] had called a natural B-adic encoding -or a similar counterpart in the Hájek-Pudlák textbook [20] . Such Badic encodings are maximally compressed in that their encoding for a proof p will have a bit-length approximately proportional to the effort for writing down such a proof by hand. The Appendix A's formalized description of our encoding conventions is provided only for the sake of completeness. Its reading can be easily omitted.
Some added notation is needed to help introduce this section's main theorem. Let us say a Π * 1 sentence ∀x 1 ∀x 2 ... ∀x n ψ(x 1 , x 2 ...x n ) satisfies the App∀(a) condition when Equation (16) is true:
Similarly, a Σ * 1 sentence ∃x 1 ∃x 2 ... ∃x n ψ(x 1 , x 2 ...x n ) is said to satisfy App∃(b) when (17) is true.
These definitions refer only to the ranges of a sentence's unbounded universal and existential quantifiers. Bounded quantifiers do not have their ranges changed similarly under these definitions. 2. α uses a language that employs the eight U-Grounding function symbols and absolutely no other function symbols.
(The second condition is designed to preclude α from employing a multiplication function symbol -or any of its many functional equivalents.) Definition 5 will be the main engine used to prove IS D ( • )'s consistency preservation property, for actually several different deduction methods D. It did not exist in our prior papers. It is helpful for both shortening several of our prior proofs -and for producing substantially stronger results: In our discussion, j 1 will represent a proof of some Π * 1 theorem, called say Φ, and j 2 will be a proof of the Σ * 1 theorem that is Φ's negation. Also, m will denote the quantity Max(j 1 These observations are all that is needed to bring our proof-by-contradiction to its desired conclusion. This is because if g > h, then it is clearly impossible for both a [67] had this problem. On the other hand, our current proof of Theorem 1 is much easier to visualize. Thus in addition to strengthening [67] 's results, Theorem 1's machinery and its formal applications in the next two sections are also much more easy to visualize. REMARK 3. Section 4's literature survey had indicated that Solovay had combined the formalisms of Nelson, Pudlák and Wilkie-Paris to prove that no axiom system recognizing Successor as a total function can verify its own Hilbert consistency. Also, our literature review had mentioned that [70] has generalized this prior result to establish that there exists essentially no introspectively unified logics (α, D) where α can recognize addition as a total function and D has the power of either the Tab−Π * 2 or Tab−Σ * 2 −List deductive methodologies. At this juncture, it is possible to explain intuitively why these generalizations of the Incompleteness Theorem hold. It is because their deductive methods do not satisfy Parts (A) and (B) of Definition 5's requirements for θ−Compactification. Hence, some significant generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem take place at exactly the level where Definition 5's formalism becomes no longer applicable. REMARK 4. It also noteworthy that Parts (A) and (B) of Definition 5's requirements are impossible to satisfy when Part-2 of the definition of a Normed(a,b) system is expanded to allow for multiplication to appear as a ninth function symbol. This is intuitively because multiplication has a faster growth property than addition, which will overwhelm Definition 5's constraints. Moreover, a Level(0-) styled semantic tableaux generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem in [68] implies that no useful analog of Definition 5 can be found for axiom systems recognizing multiplication as a total function, under any possible deduction method D, whether cut-free or otherwise. 
Formal Analysis of Semantic Tableaux

Notation:
Given an axiom system Z, a Z-Based Deduction Tree is defined as a tree of sentences -where every node of this tree is either a formal axiom of Z or a deduction from an axiom, using one of Section 2's eight rules for Tableaux-style deductions. This definition differs from a Semantic Tableaux proof in two respects. These are:
i: Since a Z-Based Deduction Tree is not technically "a proof", its root will store an axiom of Z (rather than store the negation of a target theorem).
ii: Unlike Section 2's definition of a "Semantic Tableaux proof tree", a Z-Based Deduction Tree will not be required to have every one of its branches "closed" by a pair of contradictory sentences. (Indeed, if Z is consistent, then its Z-Based Deduction Trees will always contain at least one branch that is not "closed".)
Also, the notation (below) is used when discussing Z-Based Deduction Trees:
1. The U-Length of a node sentence s is defined to be the number of U-grounding function symbols appearing in this sentence.
2. The U-Depth of a node sentence s, henceforth denoted as ∆(s), is defined to be the sum of s's U-length with the U-lengths of all its ancestors.
3. The U-Height of a Deduction Tree is the maximum U-Depth value among its leaves.
Some notation is needed to start our discussion. For any ordered pair (a, b) with a > b ≥ 1, let Z denote an Normed(a, b) system, T denote a Z-Based Deduction Tree, and β denote a branch of T. Let VAL( • ) denote a "valuation" function that maps each parameter symbol u (appearing in the branch β ) onto an integer VAL(u), satisfying the following two constraints:
I: Suppose a node s of the branch β introduces a new parameter symbol u via one of Section 2's ∃ quantifier Elimination rules. Then Item 2's ∆(s) symbol will satisfy the inequality:
II: Every node-sentence s along the branch β will satisfy the following 3-part condition: II-a: If s is a Π * 1 sentence then it will possess an App∀(a) level of validity under the valuation VAL.
II-b:
If s is a Σ * 1 sentence then it will be App∃( b ) valid under VAL.
II-c:
If s is a ∆ * 0 sentence, then it will be a logically valid statement under the valuation's scheme for assigning an integer value VAL(u) to each parameter symbol u. (This third requirement can be thought of as the intersection of requirements II-a and II-b because their combination corresponds to II-c's requirement when a sentence contains absolutely no unbounded quantifiers. This is because our definitions of App∀(c) and App∃(c) involves changing a sentence's unbounded quantifiers so that their ranges are bound by c , but it implies no similar change in a bounded quantifier's range.) Henceforth, a node N in the deduction tree T will be called Positive(a,b) iff the union of N 's sentence with its ancestors in the deduction tree T satisfy the conditions I and II under some valuation VAL. Also, a root-to-leaf branch β will be called Positive(a,b) when there exists a valuation VAL where all its nodes satisfy the conditions I and II. PROOF. The easiest manner to prove Lemma 1 is to first give an algorithm that constructs T's Positive Branch and then to prove the correctness of this algorithm. Our algorithm for constructing this branch β and its valuation VAL from the input (a, b, T ) will be called Probe(a, b, T ). Its four steps are listed below:
1. The top node along the path β will always be T 's root.
2. Suppose the first i nodes along the path β are N 1 , N 2 , ... N i and N i has two children, denoted as N e and N f . In this case, the deduction tree T has used either the ∨ or → Elimination rule to justify this binary split, and we will let Ψ e and Ψ f denote the two sentences stored in these two nodes. The algorithm Probe(a, b, T ) will make the "left child" N e constitute the next element along β's path when the valuation VAL has Ψ e satisfy condition II. Otherwise, it will make N f be β's next node.
3. If the first i nodes in β's path are N 1 , N 2 , ... N i and N i has only one child, denoted as N i+1 , then the algorithm Probe(a, b, T ) will "attempt" to make N i+1 into β's next node. If N i+1 introduces a new parameter symbol u, this "attempted step" will also assign VAL( u ) the smallest integer value satisfying the Positive(a, b) condition (consistent with earlier assignments the valuation VAL had already made). The proof that this "attempted extension" of β will always successfully satisfy the Positive(a, b) condition has nine subcases, labeled (a) through (i), appearing on the next several pages.
4. The procedure Probe(a, b, T ) will iteratively repeat Steps 2 and 3 to make the path β become longer and longer until it reaches the tree's leaf-level.
The remainder of our proof of Lemma 1 will be devoted to establishing that the procedure Probe(a, b, T ) will successfully construct a Positive(a, b) branch when the deduction tree T satisfies this lemma's hypothesis. The Principle of Induction will be employed to justify this claim. Our inductive proof shall assume that the first i nodes N 1 , N 2 ...N i along the path β satisfy the positive condition, and it will use this fact to deduce N i+1 is also positive. Our inductive proof will be divided into nine sub-cases because we must separately consider the possibilities that N i+1 is an axiom of Z or is deduced via one of the eight Tableaux-style Elimination rules, that were formally defined in Section 2. c. The Case where N i+1 is generated by the "Bounded" type ∃ Elimination Rule (i.e. Deduction Rule 6): This case is analogous to Item b, although it is more complicated. In this case, an ancestor N j of N i+1 will represent the formal sentence ∃ v ≤ t ψ(v), and N i+1 is a deduction from N j introducing a new symbol u * and storing the sentence u * ≤ t ∧ ψ(u * ). Let ∆ denote N i+1 's U-Depth, and let L denote N i+1 's U-Length. Since N j can be inductively presumed to satisfy Part I of the definition of Positiveness and because N j has a U-depth ≤ ∆−L, it follows that every parameter symbol u 1 , u 2 , ... u m appearing in N j will satisfy VAL(
In turn, this implies that VAL( t ) has an integer value no greater than b · 2 ∆ (because t is constructed by taking input values no larger than b · 2 ∆−L and applying no more than L iterations of growth-functions using these inputs -where the Double operation is the fastest available growth function). Since N j can be inductively assumed to satisfy Part II-c of the definition of Positiveness and it is a sentence of the generic form ∃ v ≤ t ψ(v), we can certainly construct a valuation where VAL( u * ) ≤ b · 2 ∆ and where VAL( u * ) assures that N i+1 will consequently satisfy Parts I and IIc of the Positive(a, b) condition. 2 d. The Case where N i+1 is generated by the "Unbounded Version" of the ∀ Elimination Rule (i.e. Deduction Rule 7): This Elimination rule allows N i+1 to represent a sentence φ(t), when an ancestor N j of N i+1 stores the sentence ∀v φ(v) and t represents a term in the U-Grounding language. Our Deduction Rule 7 further requires that each parameter symbol u, appearing in Rule 7's term t , must be previously introduced by an ancestor of N i+1 , employing the ∃ Elimination Rule.
It is automatic from the last fact that N i+1 will satisfy Part-I of the definition of the Positiveness (simply because there are no new parameter symbols u introduced by the ∀-Elimination Rule). To show that N i+1 also satisfies the Part-II requirement, ∆ and L will again denote N i+1 's U-Depth and U-Length. Then since t has no more than L function symbols and no newly introduced parameter symbols, we can apply Case (c)'s methodology to again conclude that VAL( t ) ≤ b · 2 ∆ (see footnote 2 ).
Hence since T has a U-Height less than Log 2 a − Log 2 b, we get VAL( t ) ≤ a. PROOF. Our proof of Lemma 2 will be a proof-by-contradiction. We will thus entertain the hypothesis that T has a closed Positive (a,b) branch containing simultaneously some sentence Υ and its negation, and show that this assumption leads to a contradiction.
From the fact that all axioms in a Normed(a, b) system are Prenex* sentences of the Π * 1 and Σ * 1 types, it follows that a branch can contain a sentence Υ and its strictly encoded negation of the exact form " ¬ Υ " only when both Υ and ¬ Υ are ∆ * 0 sentences (i.e. see footnote 3 ).
applies no more than L iterations of the doubling and addition functions to inputs whose initial sizes are bounded by b · 2 ∆−L . 3 The classes of ∆ * 0 formulae were defined in Section 2. They consisted of any sentence all of whose quantifiers were bounded. On the other hand, our defining conventions implied that if a sentence Υ was Σ * 1 or Π * 1 BUT NOT ∆ * 0 , then it must contain one or more unbounded quantifier to the left of all other logical symbols, including the " ¬" symbol. This means that if Υ is either a proper Σ * 1 or Π * 1 sentence, However, Part II-c of the definition of Positiveness indicates each ∆ * 0 sentence, appearing in a Positive(a, b) branch, must be a valid statement under the branch's valuation function. Hence, the concerned valuation must cause Υ and ¬ Υ to become simultaneously valid.
The latter property of Υ and ¬ Υ is, of course, inherently infeasible. Hence, our proof-by-contradiction has reached its goal because it has shown that it is infeasible for T to possess a closed Positive(a,b) branch.
We will now prove our second theorem about the θ−Compactification property. Let Z denote the axiom system that is the union of this Π * 1 representation for ¬Φ with α. It is easy to verify that Z is a Normed( p θ · b , b ) system (see footnote 4 ).
Our next observation is rather technical. The Appendix A's method for encoding proof-trees, as well as any other reasonable encoding methodology, will clearly satisfy Equation (20)'s inequality.
Since Theorem 2's hypothesis indicated that θ = 1 4 and Z was a Normed( p θ · b , b ) system, Equation (20) implies that the pair (p, Z) must consequently satisfy Lemma then technically ¬ Υ is neither Σ * 1 nor Π * 1 because a negation symbol appears to the left of its unbounded quantifiers. Hence since no sentence along our explored branch β has a complexity higher than Σ * 1 or Π * 1 and because both Υ and ¬ Υ appear in this Positive(a,b) branch, the forced conclusion is that Υ is a ∆ * 0 sentence. 4 The opening sentence of our proof assumed that p ≤ a b + 1. Also, Theorem 2's hypothesis indicates θ = . These identities imply p θ · b ≤ a. Since the opening sentence of our proof presumed α was a Normed(a, b) system, this p θ · b ≤ a inequality implies α is also a Normed( p θ · b , b ) system. Since ¬ Φ possesses an App∀( p θ · b ) level of validity when it is written as a Π * 1 sentence, the union of ¬ Φ with α must thus also be a Normed( p θ · b , b ) system. 1's hypothesis (i.e. see footnote 5 ). Hence, Lemma 1 implies that p must have a positive branch.
From Lemma 2, this implies that such a branch of p will fail to be closed. Hence, p cannot be a formal semantic tableaux proof (because at least one of its branches fails to be "closed"). The latter observation brings our proof-by-contradiction to its desired end by contradicting the initial assumption that p was a proof of Φ. 
II:
If Υ is a proper Σ * 1 formula then the formalized sentence " ¬ Υ " was technically viewed in our discussion as not constituting a formal Π * 1 sentence (because a ¬ symbol had appeared to the left of its unbounded ∃−quantifiers.) However, this formalized sentence " ¬ Υ " is clearly logically equivalent to a Π The notation conventions in I and II were used because they have simplified the structure for the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2. They also obviously raise the following natural question: 5 To verify that (p, Z) satisfies Lemma 1's hypothesis, it is sufficient to ascertain that p 's U-Height satisfies the inequality of U-Height(p) < Log 2 ( p θ · b ) − Log 2 b = θ · Log 2 p. The combination of Theorem 2's assumption that θ = and Equation (20) immediately implies the validity of the claimed U-Height(p) < θ · Log 2 (p) inequality. * Would the results in Theorems 2 and 3 remain valid if Item I and II's particular notation conventions were dropped? After all, one would certainly prefer these two propositions to be sufficiently robust so that they do not rely upon such exacting assumptions?
The answer to * is that the conventions used by I and II are indeed completely unnecessary. However, the formal proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 become significantly simplified when the conventions I and II are employed. In particular, the Footnote 3 in Lemma 2's proof and the opening paragraphs in the Cases (A) and (B) of Theorem 2's proof gain pleasantly simpler structures when the conventions from Items I and II are followed.
Formal Analysis of Tab−U *
1 −List Deduction. The IS D (A) axiom system of Theorem 3 -with or without Remark 5's added considerations -is already much stronger than the IS(A) system of [67] because it has a capacity to recognize its semantic tableaux self-consistency in a Level (1) PROOF. We will use the Principle of Induction to infer Theorem 4 from Theorem 2. Let P denote the Gödel number of a sequence of pairs, (t 1 , p 1 ), (t 2 , p 2 ), ... (t n , p n ), which constitute a Tab−U * 1 −List proof of a theorem Φ from a Normed(a, b) axiom system called α. The formalism for θ−Compactification (given in Definition 5) indicates that this construct applies to any proof P which satisfies (21)'s inequality.
Let Q denote the quantity defined below:
A later step in our proof will use the fact that Equations (21) and (22) imply (23)'s validity.
Our inductive construction is allowed to assume that each of the intermediate theorems of t 1 , t 2 , ... t n−1 have Tab−U * 1 −List proofs no larger than Q (because this invariant holds under all typical encoding conventions, including the particular encoding method delineated in Appendix A). In this context, our proof-by-induction may presume that for each integer i ≤ n − 1, the sentence t i will have A: an App∃( Q θ · b ) level of validity when t i is a Σ * 1 sentence, and
The union of α with the sentences t 1 , t 2 , ..
axiom system. Let us call this axiom system α * .
We will next use the fact that p n is the Gödel number of a semantic tableaux proof from the axiom system α * of the theorem Φ. This fact combined with Theorem 2, Equation (23) and
that:
ii: Φ has an App∀( a ( Q · p n ) θ ) level of validity when it is a Π * 1 theorem.
Since Equation (22) indicates P ≥ Q · p n , the invariants (i) and (ii) in turn imply:
A: Φ has an App∃( P θ · b ) level of validity when it is a Σ * 6 The second paragraph in Theorem 4's proof indicated that α * was a Normed(
axiom system. Also, Theorem 2 indicated that semantic tableaux deduction satisfied the θ−Compactification property. From the formal description of this property (in Definition 5), it is apparent that every semantic tableaux proof pn of a theorem Φ (from the axiom system α * ) shall automatically satisfy the invariants (i) and (ii) when pn satisfies the inequality of:
The final point is that Equation (23) and the fact that θ = 1/4 imply that pn does, in fact, satisfy the above inequality. Hence, the above construction shows that invariants (i) and (ii) do hold. 2
PROOF. An immediate consequence of Theorems 1 and 4 because the latter result shows that IS D ( • ) satisfies the Theorem 1's requirements for consistency preservation. REMARK 6. A class of self-justifying statements, called the Tangibility Reflection Principles, was defined in [67] . It is possible to hybridize our current results with [67] 's formalism -so that Tab−U * 1 deduction can be incorporated into axioms systems verifying their tangibility principles. (These hybrids are also compatible with the Tab−Q * 1 and the other 1-deductive methods of Remark 1.) The details for constructing such hybrids are very lengthy. They are therefore not done here. Our article [67] explains why the tangibility reflection principle is actually very useful.
REMARK 7. This paper was submitted to the Journal of Symbolic Logic in August of 2004, and we have not made any major changes in the manuscript since then except essentially for responding to the referee's suggestions, all of which were very helpful. During the 9-month period following the submission of this manuscript, we continued working on this on-going research project, and found an interesting application of Theorem 5's formalism. This application requires a rather lengthy description, and its characteristics are summarized by the conference announcement [71] and its accompanying full-length technical report. It essentially explains how if one changes the venue of application from integer arithmetic to a computer's floating point arithmetic environment, then Theorem 5's IS D (A) formalism can formally recognize each of the computer operations of addition, multiplication, subtraction and division as total functions among computerized representations of real numbers. In particular, [71] views a real number as an ordered pair of bit-strings for representing the mantissa and exponent, and it employs the usual computer hardware convention of rounding a real number after an arithmetic operation so that the outputted mantissa will have a bit-length no larger than the maximum of the lengths of the two input mantissas. This type of formalization of floating point arithmetic, described more fully in [71] , is useful for reminding ourselves that there do exist certain particularized respects in which a self-justifying axiom system can recognize multiplication as a mathematically total function. Such applications do not change the fact that IS D (A) cannot recognize integer multiplication as a total function -and that our year-2002 paper [68] showed that no reasonable self-justifying axiom system can overcome this obstacle. However, it does show that there are certain types of computerized real-valued cousins of integer multiplication that IS D (A) can recognize as formally total. 
Formal Proof of NS
k,m D (A)'s Inconsistency Property. Let Cons α (n) be the "finistic consistency statement" which declares that there is no proof of 0=1 from the axiom system α whose length is less than n. Both Friedman and Pudlák [14, 40, 43, 44] have observed that for some constant > 0, most consistent systems α require a bit-length at least as large as O( n ) to prove Cons α (n). These results do not apply to all self-justifying axiom systems α that recognize addition but not multiplication as a total function. For instance, consider the possibility that n = 2 ii: Subst ( g , h ) will denote Gödel's well-known ∆ * 0 substitution formula -which yields TRUE when g is an encoding of a formula and h is an encoding of a sentence that replaces all occurrence of free variables in g with the Gödel-encoded term g .
iii:
will denote the Gödel diagonalization sentence which states "There exists no proof (using deduction method D ) of this sentence from the axiom system NS k,m D (PA+)". 7 The point is that Equation (5)'s formalization of the Group-2 axiom-scheme permits its axioms to use a theorem Φ from the axiom system PA+ to transfer axiomatic information to the axiom system of IS(PA+) or to NS To achieve our main results, it will be necessary that (s, b) have a Π * 1 encoding. It is easy to accomplish this. Thus, let Γ(g) denote the Π * 1 formula defined by Equation (24) , and let n denote (24)'s Gödel number. Then (s, b) is formally defined to be the Π *
DEFINITION 6. The symbol CheckProof(t, p, q) will denote a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that the condition Prf NS k,m D ( P A+ ) (t, p) is satisfied and that q represents a proof (using deduction method D ) of Equation (25)'s statement from the axiom system NS
Also, F (t, p) will denote the function, which given an input of (t, p) satisfying Prf NS k,m D ( P A+ ) (t, p), will produce the minimal integer q satisfying CheckProof(t, p, q).
LEMMA 3. There exists a constant
Proof Sketch: The prior literature [1, 4, 8, 14, 20, 38, 40, 41, 50, 61, 64] has illustrated several examples of a constant C, a Gödel-encoding method M and an axiom system α such that if p is a M −encoded proof using α 's axioms then there will exist a second proof q satisfying Log(q) < O{ [ Log(p) ] C } such that q is a proof that p is a M −encoded proof using α 's axioms. An analogous construction will verify Lemma 3's validity. In this case NS PROOF. An immediate consequence of Lemma 3. 
PROOF. Equation (26)'s statement is a formalistic Π * 1 assertion whose logical content is identical to Corollary 1's statement -for the special case where t represents the sentence (a − 1, b) . Therefore, the logical validity of (26) On the Significance of Theorem 6 : There are several stronger versions of Theorem 6 than the variant above. In essence, we will focus on proving a relatively weak version of this proposition because its proof is pleasantly shorter. The Remark 8, at the end of this section, lists some stronger versions of Theorem 6. The contrast between their negative results and Theorem 5's positive result will be even sharper than that for the particular variant proven below:
PROOF. Our proof of Theorem 6 will have two parts. First, we will construct a proof W of the Gödel sentence (k − 1, m) from the axiom system NS 
Let us next recall that Pair(x, y) denotes a ∆ * 0 formula that is satisfied precisely when x is the Gödel number of a Π * 1 sentence and y is the Gödel number of the sentence that represents the negation of x 's formal statement. Under this notation convention, Equation (28) is certainly a logically valid statement. Moreover, NS k,m D (PA+) must be able to prove the validity of Equation (28) (because its Groups 0 and 1 axioms endow it with a capacity to prove every ∆ * 0 sentence that is valid under the standard model of the natural numbers.) is that the latter formalism contained Equation (9)'s added Group-zero axiom, which we denoted as Υ( k , m ). This axiom is technically unnecessary for deducing Equation (33) from (32) (because if the axiom Υ( k , m ) was absent then our proof methodology could still derive Υ( k , m ) as a theorem). However, the point is that if Υ( k , m ) is a formal axiom, then the resulting proof, deriving (33) from (32), is sharply shorter. As a result of this proof compression, it is quite routine to obtain that there exists a constant k 0 such that every ordered pair (k, m) with k > k 0 will automatically satisfy the condition that the proof W (constructed above) has a Gödel number less than 2 m k−1 . The latter observation will now enable us to complete the proof of Theorem 6. This is because it shows that that NS Main Perspective: The broader significance of Theorems 5 and 6 is difficult to appreciate until these two results are contrasted in detail. This is because the opposing results of these two theorems are quite counter-intuitive -especially when their added generalizations in Remarks 1, 6, 7 and and 8 are also contrasted. 8 The prior literature on weak axiom systems [20, 23, 34, 41, 52, 64] has noted that a good part of the force of the Principle Induction applies to the set of integers lying within the ranges of well-defined Definable Cuts, even when an axiom system does not recognize the formal validity of the Principle Induction. The proof of Theorem 6 can be modified to gainfully employ this fact when (k, m) represents a large enough pair of fixed constants. The net effect of this observation is that Theorem 6 will remain valid in the extremal case where A represents the empty axiom system -provided the threshold values for k and m are appropriately increased. The IS D (A) axiom system of Theorem 5 is stronger than the IS(A) system of our prior article [67] in two respects. These are that 1) IS D (A) uses a Level(1) rather than Level(0-) definition of self-consistency and 2) its mode of deduction replaces the semantic tableaux methodology with the more flexible Tab−U * 1 −List approach. As Remark 1 had noted, Theorem 5's consistency property can be strengthened by extending it from Tab−U * 1 to Tab−Q * 1 deduction. In essence, we opted for presenting a simplified version of Theorem 5 because it was preferable to broaden the audience for this paper through Section 5's shorter form of presentation, rather than to offer its strongest version. A more detailed commentary about IS D (A)'s significance has been provided by Remarks 2-4 at the end of Section 5.1. These remarks discuss several further respects in which IS D (A) is a close-to-maximal variant of introspective formalism, whose additional strengthening is not feasible. Also, Remark 2 explained how Section 5's methodologies significantly simplifies the proof techniques from [67] , in addition to providing a stronger and more precise form of result.
Contrast Between
Before closing, it is also helpful to recall that the definitions for Σ * 1 and Π * 1 sentences had allowed for an arbitrary combination of bounded quantifiers to appear to the right of the unbounded quantifiers of a Σ * 1 and Π * 1 sentence. This condition is called the unlimited-bounded-quantifier property. If our formalism had not incorporated this level of generality into the Tab−U * 1 −List deduction method, then the significance of Theorem 5's IS D (A) axiom system could perhaps be interpreted as a much narrowed and very restricted form of result.
However in a context where [70] has established that the Second Incompleteness Theorem applies to both Tab−Σ * 2 and Tab−Π * 2 deduction, Theorem 5 can be proven to be a very close to maximal result. This is because Tab−U * 1 −List's modus ponens rule is essentially the next weaker level of deduction available. It applies to every Σ * 1 and Π * 1 sentence satisfying the previous paragraph's unlimited-bounded-quantifier property, rather than to a narrower subset of this generic class (i.e. see footnote 9 ).
Thus, the IS D (A) system provides an unusual combination of qualities. It is unconventional firstly because IS D (A) does not recognize integer-based multiplication as a total function -a drawback whose consequences simply cannot be easily ignoredeven when Remark 7 noted that IS D (A) can recognize floating point multiplication as a formally total function. Also, IS D (A)'s Group-3 axiom employs an unusual form of restricted modus ponens principle. One reason IS D (A) should stimulate scholarly interest, despite its clearly evident partial disadvantages, is because it possesses a type of limited (and certainly not full) understanding of its own self-consistency -under a definition of consistency that is applicable to the previous paragraph's Level-1 styled form of deduction.
The main reason for interest in IS D (A) is, of course, because it is always helpful to consider unconventional boundary-case paradigms, to help sharpen one's understanding of great seminal theorems, such as for instance Gödel's historic incompleteness result. Our discussion has deliberately avoided speculations about the fuller epistemological implications of self-justifying axiom systems, similar to IS D (A), because such implications are very complex -especially when all self-justifying systems which affirm their own Level(0-) semantic tableaux consistencies are inherently unable [68] to prove multiplication is a total function among integers. Instead, our goal has been to sharpen the scholarly understanding of the Second Incompleteness Theorem's meaning, by having the contrasting positive and negative results of Theorems 5 and 6 help identify the mathematical threshold levels where this incompleteness theorem formally takes hold.
The example of our 4-node proof tree would thus be encoded as: ψ 2 ) ( ψ 3 ( ψ 4 ) ) ) (34) The preceding paragraph summarized our method for encoding semantic tableaux proofs. Its generalization for encoding of Tab− proofs is straightforward. Thus if p 1 , p 2 , ...p n collectively constitute a list of semantic tableaux proofs then the natural concatenation of their byte strings will be the corresponding Tab− proof.
This byte-styled encoding method is approximately analogous to what Wilkie-Paris [64] have called a natural B-adic encoding or a similar counterpart in the Hájek-Pudlák textbook [20] . Such compressed encodings are considered to be more meaningful and efficient than an uncompressed encoding method, using say a Prime Number decomposition scheme [30] (because the latter has an unnecessarily long bit-length). All our theorems would also be valid for uncompressed encoding methods. However, they are more meaningful when one uses an efficiently compressed B-adic encoding method.
We will now bring our proof-by-contradiction to a conclusion by employing Lemma 2. It indicates that such a positive branch of p cannot be closed. Hence, p cannot be a semantic tableaux proof (because one of its branches remains open). This observation brings our proof-by-contradiction to its desired end by contradicting the initial assumption that p was a proof of Φ. 2
